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NOTE
Due Process and Parole Revocation
I.

INTRODUCTION

Daryl Standlee was convicted-of rape in 1959 and sentenced
to a maximum of sixty years' imprisonment.• He was paroled on
September 29, 1970. Less than a year later, Standlee was arrested
on charges which included kidnapping, assault, and attempted
rape. A parole-revocation hearing was convened. At the request
of his counsel, however, the hearing was continued pending the
completion of Standlee's criminal trial on the same charges.
At that trial, the complainants identified Standlee as their
assailant. He countered with the testimony of two alibi witnesses.
Standlee's girl friend and a Mrs. Merrill testified that he had
been in Portland on the night of the· offense, which had been
committed in Seattle. The trial court found that Mrs. Merrill's
testimony created a reasonable doubt as to Standlee's guilt.
[T]he testimony of Mrs. Merrill impressed me, not only her
testimony but her appearance and demeanor upon the witness
stand. . . . [T]o me her testimony is the one that weighed the
scales of balance, whichever way they would fall . . . . [S]he left
a reasonable doubt in my mind as to whether or not this defendant
was the man who committed the offense. 2

Accordingly, the court acquitted Standlee of all charges.
Thereafter, the state reconvened the parole-revocation hearing and presented the same evidence which at trial had not sustained a criminal conviction. But since Standlee was unable to
pay Mrs. Merrill's travel expenses, her testimony was read into
the record from the trial transcript. Her appearance and demeanor, which the trial court had found decisive, could not be
considered. The Parole Board found that the preponderance of
the evidence indicated that Standlee had committed the crimes
charged. Accordingly, it revoked his parole and ordered him recommitted for a fifteen-year term beginning June 21, 1971.3
Standlee's quest for habeas corpus relief in state court was
1. Washington law requires the sentencing judge to impose the maximum statutory
sentence. The actual time served is determined by the state's parole board. See Mempa
v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 131 n.2 (1967).
2. Standlee v. Rhay, 557 F.2d 1303, 1305 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting trial judge),
3. See Standlee v. Rhay, 403 F. Supp. 1247, 1248 (E.D. Wash. 1975),
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unsuccessful. 4 He then petitioned the federal district court for a
writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the doctrine of collateral estoppel as embodied in the fifth5 and fourteenth6 amendments
barred the revocation of his parole. Specifically, he urged that his
acquittal at trial had established that he had not perpetrated the
crimes charged and that the state was estopped to relitigate that
issue.
The district court held that revocation of parole is a punitive
sanction7 and that the case was therefore controlled by the rule
the Supreme Court propounded in Coffey v. United States: 8 when
a defendant has been acquitted of criminal charges, the acquittal
bars, on principles of res judicata, relitigation by the state of the
issue of guilt in any subsequent civil suit to impose a punitive
sanction. 9 The Coffey rule applied, the district court concluded,
even though the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof
used at the revocation hearing required a lesser showing of guilt
than did the reasonable-doubt standard used at trial. The district
court therefore issued the writ of habeas corpus. 10
The court of appeals reversed. 11 It described parole revocation as a remedial rather than punitive sanction12 and accordingly
held the Coffey rule inapplicable .. Because of the different standardef of proof in triminal and revocation proceedings, a difference which it felt had been approved by the Supreme Court, 13 the
4. Standlee v. Smith, 83 Wash. 2d 405, 518 P.2d 721 (1974).
5. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445-47 (1970) (collateral estoppel inheres in
the fifth amendment's prohibition against double jeopardy); note 177 infra.
6. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (fourteenth amendment due process
clause makes the fifth amendment double jeopardy clause applicable to the states).
7. Standlee v. Rhay, 403 F. Supp. 1247, 1254 (E.D. Wash. 1975).
8. 116 U.S. 436 (1886).
9. 116 U.S. at 443.
10. Standlee v. Rhay, 403 F. Supp. 1247, 1256 (E.D. Wash. 1975).
11. Standlee v. Rhay, 557 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1977).
12. Revocation of parole is remedial rather than punitive, since it seeks to
protect the welfare of parolees and the safety of society. . . . The termination of
parole results in a deprivation of liberty and thus is a grievous loss to the parolee.
But the harshness of parole revocation does not alter its remedial nature.
Standlee v. Rhay, 557 F.2d 1303, 1306 (9th Cir. 1977).
13. "This lesser standard has been recognized by the Supreme Court as one of the
crucial factors distinguishing parole revocation from criminal proceedings. See Morrissey
v. Brewer••.• It also i~ the reason why appellee had his parole revoked even though he
was acquitted of the criminal charges." Standlee v. Rhay, 557 F.2d 1303, 1307 (9th Cir.
1977).
In fact, the Court in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), recognized that a lower
standard of proof is used in parole-revocation hearings, but the Court neither approved
nor disapproved of that difference: "Sometimes revocation occurs when the parolee is
accused of another crime: it is often preferred to a new prosecution because of the proce-
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court of appeals held that the state was not collaterally estopped
from relitigating the identity issue in the revocation hearing. 14
Therefore, it reversed the grant of the writ of habeas corpus. 10
Standlee may or may not have been guilty of the crimes
charged. The trial court was not convinced by the state's evidence.16 But because the state's initial failure of proof was not
conclusive, Standlee could be returned to prison to serve an additional fifteen years. This Note submits that that result is unconscionable.
The possibility of a criminal acquittal followed by revocation
of parole on the same charges is symptomatic of the disparity
between the due process rights of criminal defendants and those
of parolees facing revocation. Parole is revoked in civil proceedings conducted before an administrative agency, the Parole
Commission. The Supreme Court has said that such a hearing is
not part of a criminal prosecution and, accordingly, that the full
panoply of criminal-procedure safeguards does not apply to it. 17
Indeed, before the 1972 decision in Morrissey v. Brewer, 18 it
was commonly felt that a parolee need have no procedural protections.19 Justifications for this view20 derived from the idea that the
dural ease of recommitting the individual on the basis of a lesser showing by the State."
408 U.S. at 479.
14. The difference in the burdens of proof in criminal and civil proceedings
usually precludes application of collateral estoppel. . . • Because of this difference
in the burdens of proof an adjudication of the issues in a criminal case "does not
constitute an adjudication on the preponderance-of-the-evidence burden applicable
in civil proceedings."
Standlee v. Rhay, 557 F.2d 1303, 1305 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235 (1971)).
15. Standlee v. Rhay, 557 F.2d 1303, 1308 (9th Cir. 1977).
16. See text at note 2 supra.
17. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972).
18. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
19. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942, 952 (8th Cir. 1971), reud., 408 U.S.
471 (1972); Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 906 (1970); Eason
v. Dickson, 390 F.2d 585 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 914 (1968); Rose v. Haskins,
388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968); Williams v. Dunbar, 377 F.2d
505 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 866 (1967); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963); Johnson v. Tinsley, 234 F. Supp. 866 (D. Colo.), affd.,
337 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1964).
20. The theories, all of which were implicitly rejected by the Court in Morrissey as a
basis for denying due process to parolees, have been variously classified by the courts and
commentators. Essentially, there are four main justifications for denying due process
protection in parole-revocation proceedings:
a)The Right-Priuilege Distinction: Since parole is an act of grace conferred at the
discretion of the state, and since the parolee has no right to his conditional liberty, no
due proess protection need be afforded him if the state decides to terminate the liberty.
b)Contract Theory: Since the state grants parole at its option, it may contractually
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grant of parole is an "act of grace" by the state, 21 that having
magnanimously conferred parole, the state may freely terminate
it. On that reasoning, due process is not implicated.
The Court has now recognized that "the [parolee's] liberty ·
is valuable and must be seen as within the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment.'' 22 But due process, "unlike some legal
rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated
to time, place and circumstances." 23 Rather, it is flexible. and
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands. 24
In Morrissey, the Court set the level of due process needed
in parole revocations. Specifically, it held that the parolee facing
•revocation has a right (a) to receive written notice of the claimed
parole violations; (b) to hear the evidence against him; (c) to be
heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing the confrontation); (e) to have a neutral and detached hearing
body, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers;
and (f) to be given a written statement by the fact-finders of the
evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking parole. 25 A subsequent case added the right to appointed counsel if the hearing
body finds that the parolee asserts a "colorable claim" of innocence.28
impose any conditions it desires, including the condition that parole may be revoked
summarily at the discretion of the state.
c)Constructive Custody: Parole merely extends the prison walls, and since the parolee is still in the custody of the Attorney General, he has no true liberty to lose. He is
therefore entitled to no due process protection.
d)The Civil-Criminal Distinction: Since the parolee was validly convicted at the
original criminal proceeding, and since punishment was properly imposed, the decision
to revoke parole is merely an administrative determination by the state to substitute one
form of punishment for another, a civil proceeding to which no due process rights attach.
For discussion of these theories see Cohen, Due Process, Equal Protection and State
Parole Revocation Proceedings, 42 U. CoLO. L. REv. 197, 206-15 (1970); Comment, The
Parole System, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 282, 286-95 (1971); Comment, Due Process and Revocation of Conditional Liberty, 12 WAYNE L. REV. 638, 643-48 (1966); Note, Parole: A Critique
of Its Legal Foundations and Conditions, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 702, 704-20 (1963).
21. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492-93 (1935): "Probation or suspension of sentence
comes as an act of grac.e to one convicted of a crime, and may be coupled with such
conditions in respect of its duration as Congress may impose."
22. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
23. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (quoting Joint AntiFascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) (Frankfurtet, J., concurring)).
24. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972).
25. 408 U.S. at 489.
26. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973).
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This Note argues that these protections are inadequate and
that additional protections are constitutionally required. Specifically, the procedural rights guaranteed in juvenile-delinquency
hearings should be extended to parole revocations so that parolees
have (a) the privilege against self-incrimination; (b) an unconditional right to counsel; and (c) the protection of the reasonabledoubt standard of proof.
Part II explores the origins of the parolee's due process rights.
It first discusses Goldberg v. Kelly, 21 a welfare-termination case
in which the Court recognized the concept of statutory entitlement-the concept that governmental largesse is a form of property which cannot be taken without due process. This Note then
argues that in Morrissey v. Brewer, 28 the Court implicitly equated
the interests at stake in parole-revocation and welfare-termination proceedings and that it therefore applied Goldberg's
welfare model of procedures to parole revocation.
The Note next compares the parolee's interest with the welfare recipient's and discovers two important differences. First,
the parolee's liberty does not depend on statutory entitlement but
upon his continued observance of parole conditions-while conditional, his liberty is akin to that of the ordinary citizen, rather
than to governmental largesse. Second, the potential consequences of parole revocation are far more onerous than those of
welfare termination. These differences, it is argued, make the
parolee's interest in an accurate decision more important than
the welfare recipient's and require greater protection than the
Goldberg procedures afford. Part II recognizes that the state's
interests preclude allowing parolees full-scale criminal rights
and therefore proposes a model of due process intermediate
between Morrissey and the criminal model.
Part ill finds such a model in the procedures of juveniledelinquency hearings. That Part traces the development of procedural protections for juveniles from the early days, when due
process was thought not to apply; through the creation of minimum due process rights in In re Gault; 29 to the recognition in In
re Winship 30 that the transcendent value of the liberty at stake
makes the juvenile proceeding sufficiently similar to a criminal
prosecution that the protection of the reasonable-doubt standard
is necessary. Part ill details the procedures mandated in the juve27.
28.
29.
30.

397 U.S.
408 U.S.
387 U.S.
397 U.S.

254 (1970).
471 (1972).
1 (1967).
358 (1970).
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nile cases and argues that the difference between those procedures and parole-revocation procedures stem from the Court's
implicit belief that while the juvenile's liberty is like that of the
ordinary citizen, the parolee's is governmental largesse and so less
deserving of protection.
Part IV examines that implicit belief by analyzing the interests at stake in the two proceedings. The Part first compares the
parolee's and the juvenile's interests and finds them constitutionally indistinguishable. The parolee's interest, lik~ the juvenile's,
is liberty. Neither the greater restrictions on nor the conditional
nature of the parolee's liberty distinguishes it from the juvenile's,
and the effect of an erroneous decision to revoke parole is as great
as that of an erroneous adjudication of delinquency. The Note
next examines the remaining justification for the different levels
of due process protection in parole and juvenile proceedings-that because the state need not grant parole, the parolee's
liberty is a "privilege" entitled to less protection than the liberty
of the juvenile-and finds it merely a tautology. In short, Part IV
contends that the kinds of interests which necessitate the additional rights afforded to juveniles are equally present j.n parole
revocation.
Part IV concludes by examining the government's interests
and showing that extending juvenile rights to parolees comports
with those interests. Such extension would promote the state's
interest in accurate decisions by assuring that confessions are
trustworthy, that defenses are adequately developed and presented, and that the possibility of an erroneous decision is reduced to an acceptable level. Furthermore, the state's interests
in saving money and keeping proceedings simple are not affected
by the privilege against self-incrimination or the reasonabledoubt standard and are only slightly more compromised by an
absolute right to counsel than by the "colorable claim" procedure
now used. In sum, the Note concludes, due process requires the
same level of protection for the parolee as for the juvenile.
Il. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DUE PROCESS

RIGHTS FOR PAROLEES

A. Due Process and the Deprivation of Property

This subpart argues that the Court in Morrissey drew from
its earlier decision in Goldberg both a rationale for applying due
process to parole revocation and a model of specific rights. The
Goldberg Court recognized that due process is required to protect
the welfare recipient's statutory property and constructed a
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model of rights appropriate to the interest at stake. In doing so,
the Court relied on the concept of statutory entitlement, a concept born of Charles Reich's 1964 article, The New Property. 31
Although some of the Court's recent decisions may have discredited Professor Reich's notion of largesse as property, 32 it is central
to an understanding of the property basis for the Goldberg rights,
which ultimately became the Morrissey rights.
l.

The Welfare Model of Procedural Safeguards

In his article, Charles Reich urged the re-evaluation of the
theories according to which governmental largesse is regulated.
Society, said Reich, developed the idea of "property" to provide
individuals the means to act independently. 33 Property creates a
zone of private power within which the majority's preferences
must yield to those of the owner. Upon this power political rights
and civil liberties depend. 34 But in the public-interest state, 35 governmental largesse has begun to supplement traditional private
property as an important form of wealth. 36 Such largesse originates with the state and can be denied or taken away to serve
some legitimate public policy. 37 The potential for arbitrary deprivation, Reich argued, raises the spectre of increasing governmental intrusion into the affairs of the individual, 38 who is decreasingly protected by private property. Therefore, said Reich, we
need a new zone of privacy around governmental largesse39 so that
it can do the work of property. Those forms of largesse closely
linked to individual well-being and status must be held as of
right. 40 In short, they must become a new form of property which
cannot be taken away without due process of law. 41
In Goldberg v. Kelly 42 the Supreme Court, citing Professor
Reich, recognized that welfare benefits are such a new form of
property, 43 that they are statutory entitlements of qualified recip31. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
32. See generally Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due
Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 469-70 (1977).
33. Reich, supra note 31, at 771-72.
34. Id. at 771.
35. See id. at 756-71.
36. See id. at 738-39.
37. Id. at 774.
38. Id. at 764.
39. See id. at 785-86.
40. Id. at 785.
41. See id. at 783-85.
42. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
43. "It may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like 'proper~y•
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ients44 and cannot be terminated without procedural guarantees
against arbitrary decisions. Specifically, due process requires a
pre-termination evidentiary hearing to resolve the question of
entitlement.
In Goldberg, the Court at the outset rejected the argument
that because welfare benefits are a privilege, due process is not
implicated. 45 Whether due process is required depends on the
equities of the case rather than on the label applied to the interest
of the individual. 46
Second, the Court balanced the competing interests of the
recipient and the state to gauge whether the recipient is constitutionally entitled to procedural safeguards when the state decides
to terminate welfare. 47 On one hand is the recipient's interest in
continuing to receive welfare. Without benefits, truly eligible recipients-those lacking independent resources-would need to
concentrate upon securing their daily subsistence and would have
neither the time nor money to seek redress from the welfare bureaucracy. 48 Furthermore, the state is interested in preventing an
erroneous termination of benefits-public assistance promotes
the general welfare by fostering the dignity and well-being of all
persons, and these purposes are best served by the uninterrupted
provision of benefits to eligible recipients. 49
On the other hand, the state is interested in the funds saved
by summary terminations. 50 Under the state's pre-Goldberg system, payments could be stopped promptly if the state had reasonable grounds to believe the recipient ineligible; few recipients
requested the post-termination hearing authorized by statute.
than a 'gratuity.' Much of the existing wealth in this country takes the form of rights that
do not fall within traditional common-law concepts of property." 397 U.S. at 262 n.8. That
footnote goes on to quote Reich's 1965 article, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The
Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965), to the effect that entitlements "are
no longer regarded as luxuries or gratuities; to the recipients, they are essentials. fully
deserved, and in no sense a form of charity." The footnote concludes by citing Reich's
earlier article, The New Property, supra note 31.
44. 397 U.S. at 262.
45. 397 U.S. at 262. See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
46. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969): "This constitutional
challenge cannot be answered by the argument that public assistance benefits are a
'privilege' and not a 'right.'" See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963)
(unemployment compensation); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (social security
benefits); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (termination of employment).
47. 397 U.S. at 266.
48. 397 U.S. at 264.
49. 397 U.S. at 264-65.
50. 397 U.S. at 265.
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Pre-termination hearings, the state argued, would be burdensome
and expensive. 51
The Court found the interests favoring due process protection weightier:
As the District Court correctly concluded, "[t]he stakes are
simply too high for the welfare recipient, and the possibility for
honest error or irritable misjudgment too great, to allow termination of aid without giving the recipient a chance, if he so desires,
to be fully informed of the case against him so that he may contest
its basis and produce evidence in rebuttal."a 2

Third, the Court specified the procedures required. Balancing the need for a preliminary determination of eligibilty against
the costs of one to the state, the Court concluded that a pretermination evidentiary hearing is necessary. 53 The Court held
that the recipient must receive advance notification of the state's
case for termination and that he must have an opportunity to
appear at the evidentiary hearing, to be represented by retained
counsel, 54 and to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.
If benefits are terminated, the recipient must receive a written
explanation of that decision. 55
Goldberg is significant in three respects. First, its rejection
of the right-privilege shibboleth means that whether procedural
safeguards are required depends upon a decision's impact on private interests rather than on a characterization of those interests
as rights or privileges. Second, and equally important, the Court
recognized a limited property interest in important governmental
benefits: If the state elects by statute to grant a benefit, it becomes a statutory entitlement of qualified recipients58 which cannot be taken away without due process of law. Third, the pattern
of due process protection established in Goldberg was adapted for
parolees in Morrissey.

The Welfare Model Applied to Parole Revocation
Morrissey v. Brewer 57 applied due process to parole revoca2.

51. 397 U.S. at 265.
52. 397 U.S. at 266 (quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 904-05 (S.D.N.Y.
1968)).
53. 397 U.S. at 264.
54. The Court made no provision for appointed counsel. 397 U.S. at 270-71. Compare
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), where the Court recognized the need for ap•
pointed counsel where a parolee or probationer asserts a colorable claim of innocence.
55. 397 U.S. at 266-71.
56. 397 U.S. at 262.
57. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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tion. Morrissey and his co-petitioner, Booher, were Iowa parolees
who had been summarily reincarcerated on the recommendations
of their parole officers. 58 Each unsuccessfully sought a writ of
habeas corpus in the district court, 59 arguing by analogy to
Goldberg that the state's failure to hold a pre-incarceration hearing had denied him due process in violation of the fourteenth
amendment. The dismissals of the writs were affirmed by the
court of appeals, 60 which found the due process clause inapplicable to the decision to revoke parole. The Supreme Court reversed. 61 Due process, said the Court, requi-res a preincarceration
hearing at which evidence can be presented and charges can be
substantiated or rebutted.
First, the Court rejected the argument that because parole
is a "privilege," revocation is wholly discretionary. Chief Justice
Burger quoted from Graham v. Richardson: 62 "[T]his Court now
has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon
whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a 'right' or as
a 'privilege.' " 63 Instead, "[w]hether any procedural protections
are due depends on the extent to which an individual will be
'condemned to suffer grievous loss.' " 64 In short: "The question is
not merely the 'weight' of the individual's interest, but whether
the nature of the interest is one within the contemplation of the
58. Morrissey pleaded guilty in 1967 to a charge of passing bad check; and was
sentenced to not more than seven years' imprisonment. He was paroled in June 1968.
Seven months later, he was arrested at the direction of his parole officer and incarcerated
in the county jail. A week later, the Iowa Board of Parole revoked his parole on the strength
of the parole officer's written report, which charged him with: purchasing a car under an
assumed name and operating it without permission; giving false statements to police
concerning his address and insurance company after a minor accident; obtaining credit
under an assumed name; and failing to report his place of residence to the parole officer.
Booher pleaded guilty in 1966 to charges of forgery and was sentenced to not more
than 10 years in prison. He was paroled in November 1968. In August 1969, he was arrested
as a parole violator, and in September of that year, his parole was, on the written report
of his parole officer, summarily revoked. The charges were that he had violated the
territorial restrictions of his parole without authorization, obtained a driver's license under
an assumed name, operated a motor vehicle without permission, and failed to keep himself
gainfully employed. 408 U.S. at 472-74.
59. The court denied the writ on April 15, 1970, in Morrissey's case and on June 16,
1970, in Booher's case. Neither decision was reported. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d
942, 944 (8th Cir. 1971).
60. Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1971). The cases were consolidated
for appeal.
61. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
62. 403 U.S. 365,-374 (1971).
63. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
64. 408 U.S. at 481 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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'liberty or property' language of the Fourteenth Amendment. " 0•
Second, in deciding whether the parolee's interest is within
the contemplation of that language, the Court evaluated the potential loss to the p~olee facing revocation. The interest at stake,
the Court reasoned, is the parolee's conditional liberty, which
enables him to hold a job, to be with his family, and to lead a
relatively normal life. Although that liberty is indeterminate and
restricted, it is valuable, and terminating it inflicts a grievous
loss. Although conditional, it is sufficiently akin to unqualified
liberty that it falls within the "liberty or property" language of
the fourteenth amendment. 88 The state thus may not abridge it
without due process of law. 87
Third, in deciding which procedures are necessary, the Court
balanced the competing interests of the parolee and the state. 08
On one hand is th_e parolee's interest in continuing his conditional
liberty. Reincarceration not only disrupts his family and employment, it also interferes with his ability to show he did not violate
his parole. Further, the parolee relies on the state's implicit promise that it will not revoke parole in the absence of a violation. 69
.Finally, the state itself has an interest in not revoking parole if
parole is adequately serving its corrective function and an interest
in not embittering parolees by treating them arbitrarily.70
On the other hand, the state must prevent antisocial conduct. The Court recognized that, since parolees have been previously convicted and since some cannot live in society without
committing additional crimes, the state has an "overwhelming"71
interest in being able to imprison actual parole violators without
the burden of a new criminal trial.72
The Court found the interests favoring a pre-incarceration
hearing controlling: because incarceration so completely disrupts
his life, the parolee cannot be locked up solely on the recommendation of his parole officer. Yet logistical problems may preclude
a full-scale evidentiary hearing at the time and place of the alleged violation, and the state cannot permit suspected parole
violators to remain at large until such a hearing can be conducted. The Court's solution was dual hearings.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

408 U.S.
408 U.S.
408 U.S.
408 U.S.
408 U.S.
408 U.S.
408 U.S.
408 U.S.

at 481. See generally Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
at 481.
at 482.
at 483-84.
at 482.
at 484.
at 483.
at 483.
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The first hearing simply determines whether there is probable cause to believe that the individual has violated parole.73 The
hearing must be conducted by a parole officer not directly involved in the case; it must be at or reasonably near the place of
the alleged violation and as soon as possible after the arrest. 74 The
parolee must be notified before the hearing of the charges against
him, permitted to appear at the hearing and to present evidence
in his behalf, and allowed to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses (unless the fact-finder determines that this would jeopardize their safety). If probable cause is found, the parolee must
be given a written summary of the evidence which led to that
decision. 75
These procedures reflect the influence of Goldberg, which the
Court cited several times.7 6 The pre-incarceration hearing is a
direct extension of Goldberg's pre-termination hearing. The requirements of a neutral trier of fact; of advance notice; of an
opportunity to appear, to present evidence, and to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses; and of a written explanation of
the decision were transplanted from the welfare-termination
hearing~ The only difference is that the Morrissey Court did not
say whether a parolee has a right to retain counsel to represent
him at the parole hearing~the Court found it unnecessary to
decide that question. 77
73. 408 U.S. at 485.
74. Arrest sometimes involves incarceration in an institution distant from the place
of the alleged violation. It will be difficult for the parolee to rebut even spurious a!legations
if so confined. Furthermore, since there is often a substantial time lag between arrest of
the parolee and revocation of parole, 408 U.S. at 485, exculpatory evidence can disappear
in the intervening period. And even if ultimately exonerated, the parolee can lose employment and thus suffer financial hardship by the mere fact of incarceration:
Because a new period of incarceration, even if only 24 hours in length, may cost
a parolee his employment, and further jeopardize his chances for rehabilitation, the
detention of an alleged violator is a serious matter and must be dealt with in a
manner which clearly recognizes the degree of loss to be suffered.
S. REP. No. 94-369, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1976) (referring to the then-pending Parole
Commission and Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-18 (1976)).
75. 408 U.S. at 485-87.
76. 408 U.S. at 485-87.
77. 408 U.S. at 489. In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), the'Court extended
to probation-revocation proceedings the due process rights established in Morrissey.
Gagnon imposed the additional requirement that the indigent parolee or probationer who
asserts a colorable claim of innocence have appointed counsel. The applicability of the
right was to be determined by the Parole Commission case by case. The Court was not
presented with the question whether a parolee with independent resources was entitled
to retained co.unsel.
Congress felt that the right to retained counsel should be recognized as well. In the
Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4214(a)(2)(B) (1976), it provided
that in hearings held pursuant to that section there shall be "opportunity for the parolee
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Yet the Court recognized that a hearing which simply finds
probable cause to believe a parolee violated his parole is not due
process. Such a hearing answers only the first of three separate
questions: whether there is enough evidence to justify incarcerating the parolee pending a full-scale evidentiary hearing; if so,
whether the evidence presented at the revocation hearing justifies
the conclusion that the individual violated his parole; and finally,
whether parole should be revoked. 78 The discretionary decision to
revoke parole can be made only after a finding of a violation79 and
only by the federal Parole Commission80 or the equivalent state
authority. Thus, a preliminary hearing alone would not provide
due process. 81
The Court therefore mandated an opportunity for the parolee
to have, upon request, a second hearing before the final decision
to revoke parole.82 This must be a full-scale hearing at which
contested facts are finally resolved and at which the Parole Commission decides what sanctions are appropriate. Its procedures
again reflect the Goldberg model: the parolee is entitled to written notice of the alleged violations; he must be informed prior to
the hearing of the evidence against him; and he must be permitted to appear, to present evidence and witnesses in his defense,
and to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (subject to
limitations to protect their safety). Finally, he must be told in
writing the reasons for an adverse decision. 83
The Morrissey decision is important for two reasons. First,
the Court established that, despite its conditional nature, the
parolee's liberty interest is within the protection of the "liberty
or property" language of the fourteenth amendment. The Court
evidently reasoned that, like the property interest of the welfare
recipient, the parolee's liberty, once granted, is a statutory enti.to be represented by an attorney (retained by the parolee, or if he is financially unable
to retain counsel, counsel shall be provided)." Thus, the parolee now has a statutory right
to retained or appointed counsel, regardless of the Commission's view of his claim of
innocence.
78. 408 U.S. at 479-80.
79. 408 U.S. at 479-80, 483-84.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 4214(d) (1976).
81. In Goldberg, New York had provided by statute that the welfare recipient could
request a post-termination hearing at which his eligibility would be finally determined.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970). Consequently, the Court was not confronted
with the question whether due process required a post-termination hearing. But given the
Court's emphasis on welfare as an entitlement, 397 U.S. at 262, it seems clear that, in
the absence of the statutory hearing, the Court would have mandated a post-termination
hearing, just as it did in Morrissey.
82. 408 U.S. at 489.
83. 408 U.S. at 489.
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tlement. A decision to terminate either welfare or parole directly
affects an important private interest, and it is immaterial that
that interest could be characterized as a privilege. Goldberg had
established that, however characterized, the property interest of
the welfare recipient is entitled to due process protection. Since
Morrissey in effect analogized the liberty interest of the parolee
to the property interest of the welfare recipient, 84 the application
of due process to parole revocation followed logically.
Second, the extent to which the Morrissey Court drew upon
Goldberg in formulating procedural safeguards for parole revocation indicates that the Court thought the parolee's interest nearly
identical to that of the welfare recipient. Goldbt;!rg recognized
that the recipient has a property interest in welfare benefits.
Morrissey recognized that the parolee has a liberty interest in
parole. By adopting the Goldberg model of procedure, the
Morrissey Court in effect equated the two kinds of interests.
There are undeniably similarities between welfare terminations and parole revocations. In each case, the state seeks to
terminate what may be viewed as a governmental benefit it was
never required to confer. The individual in each proceeding has
an interest in retaining that benefit if he is entitled to do so. The
purpose of due process in each situation is to ensure that the
question of entitlement is accurately resolved.
Because the Court accepted these similarities and did not
investigate the dissimilarities85 between the proceedings, the
Court saw no reason to go beyond the Goldberg procedures. 86
Thus, saying that its imposition of a due process requirement was
not intended to equate a revocation hearing to a criminal prosecution, 87 the Court made no provision for appointed counsel or for
invoking the privilege against self-incrimination. Further, the
84. 408 U.S. at 493, 495 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). Although the majority
opinion does not explicitly cite Goldberg as precedent for the requirement of due process,
the opinion as a whole supports the analogy. E.g., 408 U.S. at 481 (Goldberg recognized
that application of due process turns on whether the governmental action inflicts a
"grievous loss"); 408 U.S. at 482 (termination of parole inflicts a "grievous loss"). See also
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974), where the Court likened the prisoner's
liberty interest in retaining his "good time" credits to a property interest: "This analysis
as to liberty parallels the accepted due process analysis as to property . . . . We think a
person's liberty is equally protected, even when the liberty itself is a statutory creation of
the State."
85. See text at notes 90-96 infra.
86. See, e.g., 408 U.S. at 486 (since Goldberg did not require a judicial pretermination hearing to protect the welfare recipient's interest, none is required to protect
the parolee's interest).
87. "We emphasize that there is no thought to equate this second stage of parole
revocation to a criminal prosecution in any sense." 408 U.S. at 489.
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Court said that rules of evidence should be relaxed to permit
consideration of material not admissible in a criminal trial. 88 Finally, the Court noted that proof beyond a reasonable doubt has
not been required. 89 In sum, the Court transplanted the model of
procedural safeguards developed for welfare terminations into the
parole-revocation context, but it did not give complete attention
to whether the situations of the welfare recipient and the parolee
are substantially similar.

B. Due Process and the Deprivation of Liberty:
Problems with the Goldberg Analogy
This subpart argues that, while Morrissey correctly recognized that the liberty interest of the parolee is entitled to due
process protection, the Court erred in equating the iµterests of the
parolee and the welfare recipient. The Note here points out two
distinctions: first, the parolee's interest-liberty-is different in
nature from the welfare recipient's property interest and thus is
more than a statutory entitlement; second, because the consequences of parole revocation are more severe, that proceeding
jeopardizes the individual's interest to a greater extent than does
a welfare-termination proceeding. These differences make the
parolee's liberty interest, quite simply, more important than the
welfare recipient's property interest and demand a level of protection not afforded by the Goldberg procedures.
The initial problem with the Goldberg analogy is that the
interests of the parolee and welfare recipient are different in nature. The welfare recipient's "property" depends entirely upon
statutory entitlement. 90 To assure a minimum standard of living,
the state provides welfare benefits to qualified recipients who, in
turn, depend upon those benefits for support. If the state may
terminate benefits arbitrarily, it will have gained a source of
power over recipients. st Consequently, the Goldberg Court found
it necessary to provide mechanisms for deciding whether a termination of benefits is justified. 92 The result was the concept of
statutory entitlement: so long as the state continues to make the
benefit available, an individual who meets the statutory criteria
is entitled to continue to receive it.
88. 408 U.S. at 489.
89. 408 U.S. at 479. See also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789 n.12 (1973).
90. "Such benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to
receive them." Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
91. See Reich, supra note 31, at 749-51.
92. See text at note 52 supra.
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But statutory entitlement implies the ongoing provision of
consumable benefits. 93 A recipient's "property" consists only of
the right to demand that his eligibility be determined according
to objective statutory criteria. If the state elected to cease providing welfare entirely, the recipient would have no property interest
in welfare benefits.
By contrast, the liberty of the parolee does not depend upon
the concept of statutory entitlement. While parole certainly benefits the parolee, it is a nonconsumable benefit which is granted
once and then either retained or revoked. This stems from the fact
that release on parole removes restrictions formerly imposed
through confinement. Furthermore, once he is paroled, an individual's rights cannot be affected by the state's decision to cease
granting parole, for by paroling him, the state has implicitly
promised t4e parolee that, as long as he abides by the conditions
of his release, he will not be reincarcerated. 94 Thus, the parolee's
liberty interest depends neither upon his continued eligibility for
a benefit-he has already received it-nor upon the state's continued provision of similar benefits, but only upon his compliance
with conditions established at the time of his release. This is
entitlement only in its negative sense: if he ceases to qualify by
violating parole, the previously conferred 1Jenefit may be taken
away. But entitlement in this negative sense also describes the
right of the ordinary citizen to retain his liberty as long as he
observes the law. The parolee's liberty is thus very different from
the "property" of the welfare recipient.
A second important difference between the welfaretermination and parole-revocation hearings lies in the decision's
effect on the personal interests at stake. The welfare-termination
hearing resolves the question of the current entitlement of the
individual to receive benefits, and a determination of ineligibility
implies nothing as to future eligibility. The consequences of an
erroneous decision, therefore, may be only temporary. By contrast, the central issue in a parole-revocation proceeding is
whether the parolee has violated his parole. The consequences of
the decision may be far-~eaching: an erroneous revocation can
cause the incarceration of the parolee for many years. 95 Snch a
93. If benefits were not consumable, the recipient would have no need for additional
benefits in the future.
94. "Implicit in the system's concern with parole violations is the notion that the
parolee is entitled to retain his liberty as long as he substantially abides by the conditions
of his parole." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479 (1972).
95. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471. 480 (1972).

136

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 77:120

potential result makes the proceeding comparable in seriousness
to a felony prosecution. 96 The parole-revocation hearing thus not
only deals with a more significant personal interest than a
welfare-termination proceeding, 97 it threatens that interest more
profoundly.
Nevertheless, the Court held in Morrissey that the parolee is
not entitled to all the criminal-procedure protections. 98 The Court
noted that parole-revocation proceedings are conducted by an
administrative agency which finds facts and exercises discretion
and that the state's interest in avoiding overly formal procedures99 makes some criminal-procedure safeguards inappropriate.
Jury trials, for example, would be burdensome and expensive.
Strict rules of evidence might impair the Parole Commission's
ability to evaluate all the circumstances of the parolee's conduct
in predicting the likelihood of future violations. 100 While the
96. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967) ("a proceeding where the issue is whether a
child will be found to be delinquent and subjected to the loss of his liberty for many years
is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution").
97. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958).
98. 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972).
99. Release of the parolee before the end of his prison sentence is made with the
recognition that with many prisoners there is a risk that they will not be able to
live in society without committing additional antisocial acts. Given the previous
conviction and the proper imposition of conditions, the St.ate has an overwhelming
interest in being able to return the individual to imprisonment without the burden
of a new adversary criminal trial if in fact he has failed to abide by the conditions
of his parole.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972).
.
But that reasoning begs the question. The purpose of due process is to assure fair and
objective decisions. If it could be known in advance that the parolee had ignored the
conditions of his parole, the only remaining question would be whether to revoke parole,
a decision wholly within the parole authority's discretion. See text at notes 78,80, ,qupra.
Due process would require only that the parolee be allowed to explain any mitigating
circumstances. See 408 U.S. at 495 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). But the hearing must
first determine whether a violation was committed. 408 U.S. at 479. Procedural safeguards
are designed to insure that that determination is correct. To begin with the assumption
that a violation has occured is to assume the answer that due process is designed to
facilitate.
It is not, however, the purpose of this Note to advocate that the full range of criminalprocedure safeguards be applied to parole-revocation proceedings. Although there is no
logical reason such safeguards should not be made available to parolees, so radical a
departure from current practice must, practically speaking, await a corresponding change
in juvenile justice; and although procedural safeguards for juveniles are more palatable
than they would be for parolees, the Court has so far refused to apply the criminal model
to juvenile-delinquency hearings. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528,540 (1971),
discussed in note 134 infra.
100. Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) (disposition requires applica•
tion of expertise in predicting the ability of the parolee to Jive in society without committing future antisocial acts); 408 U.S. at 489 ("process should be flexible enough to consider
evidence including letters, affidavits, and other material that would not be admissible in
an adversary criminal trial").
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parolee's liberty interest requires that the state compromise to
some extent its interest in fiscal savings and administrative convenience, it does not, the Court decided, justify full-scale criminal proceedings.
This Note argues that the Court improperly struck the balance between the parolee's interests and the state's. Greater procedural safeguards are required because liberty is at stake and
because of the serious consequences of revoking parole. What is
needed, then, are procedures intermediate between Morrissey
and the criminal-trial model. Such a model would retain the
flexibility to allow thorough review by the decision-maker of all
pertinent evidence. It would allow the individual to remain silent
without risking adverse inferences. It would assure the parolee
adequate assistance in preparing and presenting a defense. And
most important, it would recognize an adverse decision's devastating impact on the parolee by requiring that the trier of fact be
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the parolee's guilt. Such
a model is provided by the procedures of juvenile-delinquency
hearings.

III.

THE JUVENILE-DELINQUENCY MODEL OF PROCEDURAL

SAFEGU~DS

The situations of the juvenile and the parolee in their respective hearings are sufficiently analogous that the juvenile and the
parolee should receive the same degree of procedural protection.
Some of the features of the analogy are readily apparent. Both the
juvenile-delinquency hearing and the parole-revocation proceeding historically were regarded as exercises of administrative discretion to which due process did not apply .101 Even today, neither
proceeding is considered a criminal prosecution, and some
criminal-procedure safeguards are inapplicable. 102 Yet despite
these similarities, the Court guaranteed juveniles rights parolees
do not have: the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to
counsel, and the protection of the reasonable-doubt standard.
As the groundwork for a criticism of the Court's failure to
employ the analogy, this Part details the development of juvenile
procedures. The Part argues that the Court granted greater rights
to juveniles than to parolees because it thought the delinquency
hearing more closely resembles a criminal trial than a welfare
101. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967).
102. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528, 540 (1971). See text at note 134 infra.
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termination. That distinction arose from the Court's assumption
that the parolee's interest is different from and less important
than the juvenile's.
In re Gault1°3 established that due process is constitutionally
required in juvenile-delinquency proceedings. Gault was accused
of making an obscene telephone call to a neighbor, an offense that
was a misdemeanor when committed by an adult. 104 Two hearings
were conducted within a week of the arrest. Although Gault and
his parents were permitted to attend, no other procedural safeguards were provided. 105 Gault, then fifteen, was adjudged a delinquent child and committed to a juvenile training school until
the age of twenty-one. Arizona law permitted no appeal from that
decision,.108 and the state courts denied his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. 107 Upon appeal, the Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the hearing's procedural safeguards had been inadequate to secure fourteenth amendment due process. 108
The Court first 'reviewed the development of the delinquency
proceeding as an alternative to punishing juveniles in appalling
adult corrections systems. 109 Arizona had made the traditional
argument that juvenile proceedings are essentially administrative
hearings in which the state acts as parens patriae 110 and is inter103. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
104. Under the former Arizona Juvenile Code, 1941 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 80, § 2
(repealed 1970), a delinquent child was defined as a child who had committed an act
which constituted an offense against any law of the state or an ordinance or regulation of
a political subdivision thereof.
105. No sworn testimony was taken at either proceeding, and the evidence of Gault's
delinquency came llntirely from statements of the arresting officer. The delinquency petition was not made available to Gault or his family until the habeas corpus proceeding over
two months later. At neither proceeding was the complainant present, and in fact she was
interviewed only once, by telephone, when the complaint was received. No transcript was
made of either proceeding, and the events of the hearings emerged only from testimony
at the habeas corpus proceeding. 387 U.S. at 4-8.
106. 387 U.S. at 8.
107. In re Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965). The initial denial of the writ was
unreported.
108. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
109. 387 U.S. at 15.
110. The Latin phrase [has] proved to be a great help to those who sought to
rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme; but its meaning is murky and its historic credentials are of dubious relevance. The phrase was
taken from chancery practice, where, however, it was used to describe the power of ·
the state to act in loco parentis for the purpose of protecting the property interests
and the person of the child.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, -16 (1967). As applied to the juvenile proceeding, the phrase was
apparently intended to mean that when the state sought an adjudication of delinquency
and appropriate "remedial" sanctions, it acted in the interest of the child rather than as
its adversary. Since the hearing was not an adversary proceeding, due process was thought
unnecessary.
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ested in treatment and rehabilitation rather than punishment. 111
But since the state's interest, however great, does not justify a
total denial of due process if the individual's interest is within the
"liberty or property" language of the due process clause, the
Court rejected the parens patriae argument as a rational basis for
denial of due process protection. 112
The Court then analyzed the differences between criminal
and juvenile proceedings involving the same conduct. 113 It noted
that Gault's offense, if committed by an adult, would have been
a misdemeanor punishable by no more than two months' confinement. Gault's sentence was six years. An adult faced with a potential sentence of that length would have had the full range of
criminal-procedure safeguards. Gault had not even been permitted counsel. Said the Court, "So wide a gulf between the State's
treatment of the adult and of the child requires a bridge sturdier
The state's role in parole-revocation proceedings has also been characterized as that
of parens patriae: "In a real sense the Parole Board in revoking parole occupies the role
of parent withdrawing a privilege from an errant child not as punishment but for misuse
of the privilege." Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 237 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 957
(1963).
111. "The child was to be 'treated' and 'rehabilitated' and the procedures, from
apprehension through institutionalization, were to be 'clinical' rather than punitive." In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967). See also In re Samuel W., 24 N.Y.2d 196, 197, 247
N.E.2d 253, 254, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414, 416 (1969), revd. sub nom. In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970). See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. Ar:r §§ 763, 766-68, 760 (McKinney 1976) (upon an·
adjudication of delinquency, the court may suspend judgment, place the child in private
custody, impose probation, or commit the child to a juvenile detention center or to the
Department of Mental Hygiene).
112. 387 U.S. at 30.
Whether any procedural protections are due depends on the extent to which an
individual will be "'condemned to suffer grievous loss." •.. The question is not
merely the "weight" of the individual's interest, but whether it is one within the
contemplation of the "liberty or property" language of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972). If the individual's interest meets these tests,
due process applies. The state's interest is relevant only in determining what procedures
are required. 408 U.S. at 481.
113. If Gerald had been over 18, he would not have been subject to Juvenile
Court proceedings. For the particular offense immediately involved, the maximum
punishment would have been a fine of $5 to $50, or imprisonment in jail for not
more than 2 months. Instead, he was committed to custody for a maximum of six
years. If he had been over 18 and had committed an offense to which such a
sentence might apply, he would have been entitled to substantial rights under the
Constitution. . .. It would assure him of specific notice of the charges and adequate time to decide his course of action and to prepare his defense. He would be
entitled to clear advice that he could be represented by counsel, and, at least if a
felony were involved, the f3tate would be required to provide counsel if his parents
were unable to afford it. If the court acted on the basis of his confession, careful
procedures would be required to assure its voluntariness. If the case went to trial,
confrontation and opportunity for cross-examination would be guaranteed.
387 U.S. at 29.
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than mere verbiage, and reasons more persuasive than mere
cliche can provide." 114
The Court therefore held that when the state seeks an adjudication of delinquency, it must provide these procedural safeguards: notice of charges; the right to counsel, either retained or
appointed; the privilege against self-incrimination; and the right
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. 115
Three years later, in In re Winship, 116 the Court required
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile-delinquency
proceedings. Winship had been accused of theft. 117 He had had
the procedural safeguards mandated by Gault but was found
guilty because state law required proof by only a preponderance
of the evidence. 118 The juvenile judge said that the evidence had
not persuaded him beyond a reasonable doubt of Winship's guilt
but that the state had satisfied the lesser burden of proof. Winship was therefore adjudged a juvenile delinquent. 119 The New
York Court of Appeals rejected his argument that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard denied him due process, 120
but, on appeal, the Supreme Court reversed.
The New York courts had held that, because the juvenile
proceeding was civil rather than criminal 121 and was designed to
save the child rather than to punish him, 122 the reasonable-doubt
standard was inappropriate. 123 Quoting Gault, the Court controverted that reasoning:
We made clear in that decision that civil labels and good
intentions do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due
process safeguards in juvenile courts, for "[a] proceeding where
the issue is whether the child will be found to be 'delinquent' and
subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution." 124
114. 387 U.S. at 29-30.
115. 387 U.S. at 31-57.
116. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
117. N.Y. FA?.1. CT. Ar:r § 712 (McKinney 1954) defined a juvenile delinquent as "a
person over seven and less than sixteen years of age who does any act which, if done by
an adult, would constitute a crime." Winship, then 12, was found guilty of having entered
a locker and taken $112 from a woman's purse. His initial sentence of 18 months in the
juvenile detention center was subject to annual renewal until he reached the age of 18.
397 U.S. at 360.
118. N.Y. FAM. CT. Ar:r. § 744(b) (McKinney 1954).
119. 397 U.S. at 360.
120. In re Samuel W., 24 N.Y.2d 196, 247 N.E.2d 253, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1969), a/fg.
W. v. Family Court, 30 App. Div. 2d 781, 291 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (1968).
121. 24 N.Y.2d at 203, 247 N.E.2d at 257, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
122. 24 N.Y.2d at 197, 247 N.E.2d at 254, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
123. 24 N.Y.2d at 203, 247 N.E.2d at 257, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
124. 397 U.S. at 365-66 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967)).

November 1978)

Note-Parole Revocation

141

The Court also rejected the state's argument that requiring
proof beyond a reasonable doubt might destroy many of the beneficial aspects of the juvenile proceeding: 125
Nor will there be any effect on the informality, flexibility, or
speed of the hearing at which the fact finding takes place. And the
opportunity during the post-adjudicatory or dispositional hearing
for a wide-ranging review of the child's social history and for his
individualized treatment will remain unimpaired. Similarly, there
will be no effect on the procedures distinctive to juvenile proceedings that are employed prior to the adjudicatory hearing. 126

The Court then evaluated the reasonable-doubt standard in
terms of the possibility of an erroneous finding of guilt. The
Court's concern was with those cases such as Winship in which
there was some doubt as to the guilt of the accused. As Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion stated, the outcome of those marginal cases, in which there is a manifest potential for error, must
reflect society's decision whether to err in favor of freeing the
guilty or of convicting the innocent:
[T]he trier of fact will sometimes, despite his best efforts, be
wrong in his factual conclusions. In a lawsuit between two parties,
a factual error can make a difference in one of two ways. First, it
can result in a judgment in favor of the plaintiff when the true facts
warrant a judgment for the defendant. The analogue in a criminal
case would be the conviction of an innocent man. On the other
hand, an erroneous factual determination can result in a judgment
for the defendant when the true facts justify a judgment in plaintiffs favor. The criminal analogue would be the acquittal of a
guilty man.
The standard of proof influences the relative frequency of
these two types of erroneous outcomes. If, for example, the standard of proof for a criminal trial were a preponderance of the evidence rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, there would
be a smaller risk of factual errors that result in freeing guilty persons, but a far greater risk of factual errors that result in convicting
the innocent. Because the standard of proof affects the comparative frequency of these two types of erroneous outcomes, the choice
of the standard to be applied in a particular kind of litigation
should, in a rational world, reflect an assessment of the comparative social disutility of each. 127

The policy reflected by requiring the reasonable-doubt stan125. For example, under New York law, an adjudication of delinquency does not
constitute conviction of a crime and therefore does not deprive the juvenile of his civil
rights. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970).
126. 397 U.S. at 366-67.
127. 397 U.S. at 370-71.
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dard in juvenile proceedings grew out of the analogy with criminal
proceedings.
There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing
error in factfinding, which both parties must take into account.
Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending value-as
a criminal defendant his liberty-this margin of error is reduced
as to him by the process of placing on the other party the burden
of . . . persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of
his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Due process commands that
no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the
burden of . . . convincing the factfinder of his guilt. 128

The Court implicitly recognized that the disutility of convicting
an innocent juvenile, of depriving him of liberty and stigmatizing
him, is greater than the disutility of freeing a guilty youth. 120
Therefore, it held that the reasonable-doubt standard is constitutionally required. 130
Thus, in Winship the Court implicitly recognized that
.whether the reasonable-doubt standard must be used depends
not upon the form of the proceeding but upon the desirability in
the particular case of avoiding erroneous adjudications of guilt.
It seems clear that the more closely the individual's interest approximates the "transcending value" of the liberty of a criminal
defendant, the greater is the desirability of avoiding error. 131 At
some point, the Constitution demands that level of certitude with
which it protects the criminal defendant: proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Gault and Winship established the core 132 of the juvenile
model of procedure. In addition to the rights they share with
parolees and welfare recipients-the rights to receive advance
notice of charges, to be heard, to present rebuttal evidence, and
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses-juveniles have
the rights to retained or appointed counsel, the privilege against
self-incrimination, and the reasonable-doubt standard.
128. Speiserv. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958), quoted inln re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 364 (1970).
129. 397 U.S. at 367.
130. "Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable.
doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime with which he is charged." 397 U.S. at 364.
131. One might, of course, argue that, whatever the value of an individual's interest,
the state may have inte~ests which override any interest of the individual and justify the
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. The Court's language, however, considered
only the interest of the individual and so does not seem susceptible to such an interpretation. See text at note 128 supra.
132. Juveniles also may claim protection against double jeopardy. See note 134 infra.
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The Court provided these additional rights because the juvenile's liberty is at stake in a delinquency hearing. 133 Because liberty, not property, is at stake, due process requires a higher level
of protection from arbitrary decisions than the Goldberg procedures alone secure. While "the juvenile court proceeding has not
yet been held to be a 'criminal prosecution' within the meaning
and reach of the Sixth Amendment, " 134 the Court plainly thought
that the potential for depriving the juvenile of his liberty makes
the delinquency hearing comparable in seriousness to a criminal
trial. t3s
By contrast, the Court has viewed the parolee's liberty as a
sort of statutory entitlement not achieving the magnitude of a
true liberty interest. 138 The Court has therefore assumed the parolee is not entitled to all the procedural safeguards afforded the
juvenile: "A juvenile charged with violation of a generally applicable statute is differently situated from an already-convicted probationer or parolee, and is entitled to a higher degree of protection."137

IV.

THE LIBERTY INTERESTS OF THE PAROLEE AND THE JUVENILE

This Part criticizes the Court's assumption that the juvenile's liberty is different from and more important than the parolee's. First, the Part analyzes and rejects possible distinctions
133. However laudable its purposes, "commitment is a deprivation of liberty. It is
incarceration against one's will, whether it is called 'criminal' or 'civil.' " In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 50 (1967). See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1970).
134. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 540 (1971). In McKeiver, the Court
refused to extend the right to jury trial to juvenile proceedings. But the distinction between criminal and juvenile proceedings was narrowed in Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519,
(1975), where the Court held that the fifth amendment's double jeopardy clause precludes
a second proceeding based on the same charge following a juvenile proceeding. It had been
commonly accepted that since a juvenile proceeding was neither criminal nor punitive, a
subsequent proceeding in which the juvenile was prosecuted as an adult was not barred.
The holding in Breed, 421 U.S. at 529, implicitly rejected the logic of cases such as
In re McDonald, 153 A.2d 651, 655 (D.C. 1959), which had stated:
Innocence or guilt are not in issue, but an adjudication of the child's status is.
Retribution and punishment are not its purposes, but protection and rehabilitation
of the child are. And if the detriments and stigma of a criminal trial do not attach
to the juvenile before this court, then it follows that neither does he have the right
to be tried as a criminal.
The Breed holding suggests that the distinction between juvenile and criminal proceedings is being eroded. While that distinction is still viable for some purposes, witness
McKeiver, the Court is apparently taking a hard look at the procedural disparities and
striking down those unrelated to the purposes of juvenile hearings.
135. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970).
136. See text following note 84 supra.
137. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789 n.12 (1973).
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between the liberty interests of the parolee and the juvenile.
Finding those interests constitutionally indistinguishable, it proposes that the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to
counsel, and the reasonable-doubt standard be extended to parole revocation. The Part concludes by examining the effect of
those changes on parole-revocation proceedings and arguing that
the changes would not significantly undermine any state interest.
The Court's assumption that the juvenile is differently situated from, and entitled to a greater degree of protection than, the
parolee suggests that the Court thinks the juvenile's interest is
somehow different from, and more important than, the parolee's. But as will be seen, the interests are, for constitutional
purposes, indistinguishable.
First, the parolee's interest, like the juvenile's, is liberty
rather than property. Justice Douglas, dissenting in part in
Morrissey, likened the grant of parole to a deed and the resultant
liberty to a property interest. 138 But that argument overlooks the
important point that when the state grants parole, it simply removes the restrictions imposed by imprisonment. The parolee
becomes free to act in any way not prohibited by the law or his
parole conditions. That freedom to act is not, however, created
by the grant of parole, but is restored by it. Such freedom was
liberty before his incarceration, and it is liberty after he is released on parole. 139 That the state need not have removed the
restrictions and may reinstitute them if the parolee violates parole conditions does not change the nature of the parolee's interest. As the Court observed in Morrissey, that interest "includes
138. 408 U.S. 471, 493 (1972).
139. This notion of "natural liberty" was well stated by Justice Stevens in his dissent
in Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976), in which the Court held that the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause does not entitle a state prison inmate to a fact-finding
hearing prior to being transferred to a state prison whose conditions are substantially less
favorable to him. In rejecting the majority's argument that liberty interests originate
either in the Constitution or in state law, Justice Stevens said:
If man were a creature of the State, the analysis would be correct. But neither
the Bill of Rights nor the laws of sovereign States create the liberty which the Due
Process Clause protects. The relevant constitutional provisions are limitations on
the power of the sovereign to infringe on the liberty of the citizen. The relevant state
laws either create property rights, or they curtail the freedom of the citizen who
must live in an ordered society. Of course, law is essential to the exercise and
enjoyment of individual liberty in a complex society. But it is not the source of
liberty, and surely not the exclusive source.
I had thought it self-evident that all men were endowed by their Creator with
liberty as one of the cardinal unalienable rights. It is that basic freedom which the
Due Process Clause protects, rather than the particular rights or privileges conferred by specific laws or regulations.
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many of the core values of unqualified liberty ." 140 Thus, in parole
revocation, as in delinquency hearings, the interest at stake is
liberty.
Yet, it might be argued, the parolee's liberty is different from
the juvenile's because it is conditioned upon his observance of
parole conditions. Parole conditions do limit the parolee's liberty.
But the state also limits the juvenile's liberty by laws not applicable to adults. For example, children generally may not purchase
intoxicants, operate motor vehicles; or stay home from school.
Juveniles who repeatedly violate such restrictions may be institutionalized. 141 fu this significant sense, the juvenile's liberty, like
the parolee's liberty, is conditional.
Furthermore, the effect of an erroneous decision on a parolee
is not less than the effect of an erroneous decision on a juvenile.
Parole permits the individual to hold a job, to be with family and
friends, to build a normal life 142-in short, to begin to regulate his
own activities. If the parolee abides by the conditions of his parole, he is entitled to retain this freedom. 143 A mistaken finding
that he violated parole deprives him of this liberty, a consequence
as serious, a disaster as painful, 144 as if he had been mistakenly :
140. 408 U.S. at 482.
141. See, e.g., Amz. REv. STAT. § 8-201-8 (1974), defining a delinquent act to include
"any act that would constitute a public offense which could only be committed by a child
or by a minor"; § 8-201-9 ·defining a delinquent child as "a child who is adjudicated to have committed a delinquent act"; § 8-241-(A)(2)(e) permitting the
juvenile court to remand a delinquent child "[t]o the department of corrections."
142. [P]erole is an established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals. Its purpose is to help individuals reintegrate into society as constructive
individuals as soon as they are able, without being confined for the full term of the
sentence imposed. It also serves to alleviate the costs to society of keeping an
individual in prison. The essence of parole is release from prison, before the completion of sentence, on the condition that the prisoner abide by certain rules during
the balance of the sentence.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972) (footnote omitted).
143. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479 (1972).
144. "Simply put, revocation proceedings determine whether the parolee will be free
or in prison, a matter of obvious great moment to him. For the prison inmate, the deprivation of good time is not the same immediate disaster that revocation of parole is for the
parolee." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560-61 (1974).
In Wolff, the Court recognized that a state prison inmate's "interest [in retaining
"good time" credits] has real substance and is sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth
Amendment 'liberty' to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the
circumstances and required by the due process clause to insure that the state-created right
is not arbitrarily abrogated," 418 U.S. at 557. While the Court noted that the prisoner's
interest is not as significantly affected by deprivation of "good time" as is the parolee's
by revocation, 418 U.S. at 561, it nevertheless found such deprivation to be "a matter of
considerable importance." But the major factor which rendered the Morrissey procedures
partially inapplicable was "the very different stake the State has in the structure and
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convicted of a crime.
Of course, it might be argued that, while an adjudication of
delinquency deprives the juvenile of future unqualified liberty,
parole revocation merely substitutes imprisonment for parole,
i.e., for only qualified liberty. But if his parole is revoked for a
criminal violation, the federal parolee loses credit for time spent
on parole. 145 This, by extending the period in which his liberty is
content of the prison disciplinary hearing." 418 U.S. at 561. Noting that "[p]rison disciplinary hearings ••• take place in a closed, tightly controlled environment[,]" 418 U.S.
at 561, and that "imposition of disagreeable sanctions necessarily involve confrontations
between inmates and authority and between inmates who are being disciplined and those
who would charge or furnish evidence against them," 418
at 562, the Court held that
the rights of confrontation and croBS-examination, 418 U.S. at 567-68, and the right to
counsel, 418 U.S. at 570, did not apply. Nevertheless, the mere recognition that even a
prison inmate has a protectable liberty interest emphasizes the much greater interest of
the parolee in retaining his liberty.
145. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972). The denial of credit for time
spent on parole or "street time" dates from the original statute, An Act To parole United
States prisoners, ch. 387, § 6, 36 Stat. 820 (1910): "If such order of parole shall be revoked
and the parole so terminated, the said prisoner shall serve the remainder of the sentence
originally imposed; and the time the prisoner was out on parole shall not be taken into
account to diminish the time for which he was sentenced."
This was subsequently combined with other provisions for arrest of the parole violator:
A warrant for the retaking of any United States prisoner who has violated his
parole, may be issued only by the Board of Parole or a member thereof and within
the maximum term or terms for which he was sentenced. The unexpired term of
imprisonment of any such prisoner shall begin to run from the date he is returned
to the custody of the Attorney General under said warrant, and the time the prisoner was on parole shall not diminish the time he was sentenced to serve.
Retaking Parole Violator Under Warrant; Time To Serve Undiminished, ch. 311, § 4205,
62 Stat. 854 (1948).
Under the Federal Parole CommiBBion and Reorganization Act, 18 U.$.C. §§ 42014218 (1976), the provision for denial of credit for street time is not quite so explicit. Section 4210(b)(2) provides that in the case of a parolee who has been convicted of a subsequent crime, "the Commission shall determine • • • whether all or any part of the unexpired term being served at the time of parole shall run concurrently or consecutively with
the sentence imposed for the new offense." According to the legislative history of the Act,
H.R. REP. No. 94-838, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. 32 (1976),
This subsection also provides that an individual whose parole has been revoked
upon conviction of any new criminal offense • . • shall receive no credit for service
of his sentence from the day he is released on parole until he either returns to
Federal custody following completion of any sentence of incarceration or upon the
Commission determining that the sentence run concurrently with any new sentence
that may have been imposed.
In other words, a conviction resulting in revocation requires a loss of street time, but the
Commission may make the unexpired portion run concurrently with any new sentence.
In the case of the parolee charged with but not convicted of a criminal violation, the
Commission must conduct both of the hearings required by 18 U.S.C. § 4214(a). But a
finding of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence may result in revocation here as
well as in the case of the parolee who has been convicted. While the Commission must
consider the fact or absence of a criminal conviction in deciding whether to revoke parole,
18 U.S.C. § 4214(d), no conviction is required for revocation.
No explicit provisfon is made for loss of street time by parolees not convicted in a

u.a.
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restricted, has the effect of extending his sentence and constitutes
a new penalty rather than a carrying out of an old one. Furthermore, since the length of the extension depends on the amount
of time spent on parole rather than on the violation charged, the
penalty imposed by revocation may be far more severe than the
statutory maximum under the criminal law. 146 In a real sense,
then, a parole-revocation proceeding is comparable in seriousness
to a delinquency hearing. 147
criminal prosecution, but the absence thereof was probably an oversight, since that sanction was retained in the case of the convicted parolee and since no language in either the
Act or the legislative history declares an intent to effect any change from the old act.
Contrast this with the presence of language in the legislative history, H.R. REP. No. 94838, at 32,. to the effect that a parolee who is reincarcerated for a violation other than
"commission" of a crime retains credit for street time. If Congress had desired to allow
credit for street time when parole was revoked on the basis of an unproved criminal charge,
this intention could similarly have been affirmatively indicated in the act or the legislative
history.
In short, while Congress did not explicitly provide for the denial of credit for street
time, Congress has shown no intention to change its earlier policy, except in the case of
technical violations, where the change is explicit. Thus it may be inferred that parole
revocation based upon a criminal charge must result in loss of credit for street time unless
the Commission chooses to allow the sentence to run concurrently with any sentence
imposed for the crime committed while on parole.
Many states provide similar penalties for parole violations. See Arluke, A Summary
of Parole Rules-Thirteen Years Later, 15 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 267, 271 (1969).
146. For example, assume that a parolee bas spent eight years on parole when his
parole is revoked for a crime punishable under the criminal law by no more than three
years' imprisonment. Because he receives no credit for time spent on parole, the parolee's
sentence is extended by eight years, five more than could be imposed in a new criminal
prosecution on the same charge. Cf. Murray v. Page, 429 F.2d 1359 (10th Cir. 1970) (parole
summarily revoked after eight years).
147. It might be argued that juvenile-procedure safeguards are simply a response to
the possibility that the proceeding will stigmatize the juvenile, and it is true that, while
a parolee has already been convicted of a crime, a delinquent may have had no prior
trouble with the law. Nevertheless, a significant proportion of persons who come before
the juvenile court may be termed recidivists who have already been stigmatized. See, e.g.,
REPOIIT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMN. ON CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 773 (1966)
(cited in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22 (1967)) (in fiscal 1965, 61% of persons referred to the
Juvenile Receiving Home had been previously referred, and 42% had been referred at least
twice before).
Moreover, a parolee whose parole is revoked is equally stigmatized. First and most
important, the revocation reflects a finding that the parolee has violated his parole, often
by committing a crime. That this finding is supported by a mere preponderance of the
evidence is irrelevant-the stigma inherent in an adjudication of delinquency was one of
the factors that motivated the Winship court to require the reasonable-doubt standard,
397 U.S. at 367. Second, the fact of and reasons for the revocation become a part of the
parolee's record and are considered in deciding whether parole should be granted when
the individual again becomes eligible, 18 U.S.C. § 4207(2)(1976), as well as in future
sentencing decisions, 18 U.S.C. § 4205(d)(1976). (Compare In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
366-67(1970), where the Court found that stigma inhered in adjudication of delinquency
despite the fact that New York law provided that such adjudication did not constitute a
criminal conviction, did not deprive the juvenile of his civil rights, and was kept confidential). Thus, the potential for stigmatization does not distinguish juvenile hearings from
parole-revocation proceedings.
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If neither the nature and conditions of the parolee's liberty
nor the consequences of its termination distinguishes the parolee's interest from the juvenile's, what distinction between
those interests might explain the disparity in procedural rights?
The distinction most readers are likely to perceive-and, this
Note suggests, the one which influenced the Court-is that, while
the juvenile's liberty is his birthright, the parolee's is the product
of his release on parole. Or, to describe the distinction differently,
since the state could simply have kept the parolee in prison, his
liberty is merely a privilege not entitled to the same protection
as that of the juvenile.
While it is intuitively appealing, however, this argument
simply reiterates the right-privilege distinction, a tautology
which the Court has rejected. 148 Whatever it might have done, 149
the state did grant parole. The question is what due process requires when the state seeks to revoke that grant. 150 To characterize the parolee's liberty as a "privilege" is merely to assert that
the state will not protect it to the same extent that it protects a
"right." If, for example, the parolee could not be deprived of his
liberty unless a violation were proved beyond a reasonable doubt
in a proceeding which afforded a full array of safeguards, that
liberty, once granted, would be a "right" as surely as is the liberty
of the juvenile. "Right" and "privilege" are thus conclusory labels, and the right-privilege distinction states only a tautology:
Because the state does not protect the parolee's liberty to the
same extent that it protects that of the juvenile, the parolee's
liberty is a privilege; because it is a privilege, that liberty is not
entitled to the same degree of protection as the liberty of the
juvenile. 151 To distinguish the liberty interest of the parolee from
148. See text at note 63 supra.
149. It is by no means clear that the corrections system could survive in its present
form if the state did not grant parole in a large number of cases. See note 176 infra.
150. It might be argued that since the state need not grant parole, it can condition
the grant on the waiver of the parolee's right to demand due process in revocation. Similar
arguments were advanced prior to the Morrissey decision. See note 20 supra (contract
theory). The fundamental problem with the argument is that it would permit the conditioning of the grant on the waiver of constitutional rights, a result prohibited by the
Court's decisions:
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation which,
by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights guaranteed by
the federal Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same result is accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege
which the state threatens otherwise to withhold.
Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commn., 271 U.S. 583, 593 (1926). See Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (state may not condition unemployment benefits on
the recipient's waiver of right to observe the sabbath on Saturday).
151. See Van Alst~e, supra note 45, at 1460. The right-privilege distinction was first
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that of the juvenile on the basis of this rationale is to hang an
intuitive result on an illusory peg.
To summarize, the liberty interests of the parolee and juvenile are, for constitutional purposes, indistinguishable. The natures of those interests are the same; both are conditional; the
consequences of deprivation are equally onerous; and characterizations as "rights" or "privileges" reflect, rather than determine,
due process.
enunciated by Justice Holmes, who was writing for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517
(1892). In that case the court denied relief to a policeman who had been qischarged for
violation of a regulation which restricted his political activity. Holmes dismissed the first
amendment argument: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics,
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."
Professor Van Alstyne, in the seminal article on the right-privilege distinction, demonstrated that Holmes' epigram, and, in effect, the right-privilege distinction itself, stated
a mere truism.
Holmes himself readily admitted that to deny that a person had a "right" to
something was merely to announce the conclusion that a court would not give any:
relief; but the denial itself provides no reason why such relief should be denied.
The impact of the McAuliffe epigram on succeeding generations of courts has
been a dual one. As used by Holmes it represents the inference that because public ·
employment is not protected, retention of that privilege may be conditioned on the
giving up of first amendment rights. This non sequitur has been exposed and
rejected by the courts applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The more
invidious impact of the epigram, however, has been its use to supply a reason why
public status is not protected in the first place - because such status is a privilege
rather than a right. But as Holmes' own analysis shows, the epigram on this point
yields no reason at all. If we take it as stating a reason, contrary to Holmes'
intention, it becomes a perfectly circular argument.
Van Alystyne, supra note 45, at 1459-60 (footnotes omitted).
The right-privilege analysis wrongly presupposes a difference in the extent to which
the parolee and juvenile are entitled to be free of arbitrary governmental action. The
problem was most acute in the pre-Morrissey days, when it was commonly thought that
revocation of parole was a matter entirely within the discretion of the parole board. The
distinction between the situation of the juvenile and that of the parolee was thought to
be that the juvenile had a right to be free from arbitrary governmental action to curtail
his liberty, while the parolee did not. But there is no such independent right.
[Dlue process is not itself a protected entitlement. Rather, the sole protected
interests are "life, liberty, [and] property." Due process stands in relation to these
not as an equivalent constitutionally established entitlement, but only as a condition to be observed insofar as the state may move to imperil one of the named
substantive interests.
Van Alystyne, supra note 32, at 452. The juvenile's due process rights derive from the fact
that his liberty is imperiled. The recognition that the parolee's interest is also liberty led
the Court in Morrissey to provide due process protection in parole revocation.
Yet the Court has not completely divested itself of the remnants of the old distinction.
The Court determined the content of due process in the parole-revocation proceeding by
the untested assumption that the juvenile is entitled to a higher degree of protection. But
the Court's assumption depends upon the very due process protection it purports to
determine and is, for this reason, entirely circular.
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_ Because the liberty interest of the parolee is like that of the
juvenile and unlike that of the welfare recipient, the juvenile
model of procedural safeguards is the appropriate one for parole
revocation. The rights to receive advance notification of charges,
to appear and present evidence, to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses, and to receive a written explanation of the
decision are secured, of course, in the Goldberg model as well as
the juvenile model. But the additional rights afforded by the
juvenile model-the privilege against self-incrimination, represent~tion by counsel, and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt-are necessary to protect adequately the parolee's
liberty interest.
Yet three factors determine the content of due process in any
given situation:
[O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of
three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail. 152

This Note has shown that the individual's interestliberty-is as important in parole revocations as in delinquency
hearings 153 and that the risk of erroneously depriving the parolee
of liberty is too high under Morrissey. 154 We must, therefore, consider the probable value of the proposed additional rights and
their effect upon the state's interests.
The state's interests are by no means uniformly opposed to
enhanced due process rights for parolees; On one hand, the state
is interested in returning parole violators to prison promptly and
without the expense or burden of a new adversary criminal proceeding. 155 To this might be added a state interest in deterring
antisocial conduct by minimizing procedural safeguards so that
any errors in fact-finding cause parole to be revoked rather than
continued. On the other hand, the state is interested in continuing parole if the parolee has not, in fact, violated any restrictions:
152.
153.
154.
155.

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
See text at notes 138-51 supra.
See text at notes 90-100 supra.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972).
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an erroneous revocation is an expensive mistake 156 which may
embitter the parolee and decrease the chance that he will be
rehabilitated. 157 This interest in continuing parole favors adding
procedural safeguards to increase the accuracy of fact-finding and
markedly weakens the state's contrary interest in reducing those
safeguards. Applying the juvenile model of due process to parole
revocation is fully consistent with the state's interest in accuracy,
and doing so would not significantly interfere with its contrary
interests in keeping proceedings simple and in returning actual
violators to prison. All this being so, the societal value of each of
the proposed safeguards outweighs any net detriment to the state
of that safeguard, as the following paragraphs show.
First, the privilege against self-incrimination would be an
important addition to a parolee's rights. The privilege would assure that confessions or admissions are trustworthy and not the
product of fear, coercion, or the parolee's belief that the alternatives associated with silence are worse. 158 Further, it would preclude the sub rosa shifting of the burden of proof to the parolee:
his failure to testify could not become the basis for adverse inferences. Finally, the privilege would allow a parolee charged with
a crime to receive fair treatment at the revocation hearing without having to reveal the defenses he will assert at his trial. 159
Neither would the self-incrimination privilege cripple the
state's interests. The enhanced trustworthiness of confessions
would further the state's interest in accuracy. Moreover, it would
cost the state nothing to allow the parolee to remain silent. Nor
would the privilege complicate the proceeding: indeed, the ab156. See note 176 infra.
157. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972):

The parolee is not the only one who has a stake in his conditional liberty. Society
has a stake in whatever may be the chance of restoring him to normal and useful
life within the law. Society thus has an interest in not having parole revoked
because of erroneous information or because of an erroneous evaluation of the need
to revoke parole, given the breach of parole conditions. . . . And society has a
further interest in treating the parolee with basic fairness: fair treatment in parole
revocations will enhance the chance of rehabilitation by avoiding reactions to arbitrariness.
(citations omitted).
158. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967).
159. See Note, Revocation of Conditional Liberty, 74 MtCH. L. REV. 525, 536-37
(1976). The possibility of a criminal prosecution should itself justify providing the privilege to parolees: "The privilege can be claimed in any proceeding, be it criminal or civil,
administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory . . . and it protec.ts any disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that might be so used." Murphy v. Waterfront
Commn., 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964) (White, J., concurring).
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sence of the parolee's testimony might speed its conclusion. The
only interest that would be compromised by the availability of
the privilege is the state's interest in erring on the side of revocation. That interest, this Note asserts, is simply outweighed by the
many interests favoring the privilege.
Second, the value of the right to counsel is well known. Representation by counsel would improve the development and presentation of possible defenses. Unlike the jailed parolee, a lawyer
would have the mobility to acquire information and the skill to
present it effectively. Furthermore, representation by counsel
would make meaningful the parolee's right to test the credibility
of adverse witnesses through cross-examination.
The right to counsel is consistent with the state's interest in
reaching a correct decision. And, while the right could make the
revocation proceeding somewhat more expensive and complicated, the Court has recognized that, in at least some revocation
proceedings, the state's interest in saving time and money is simply outweighed by the need for counsel. Thus, the Court held in
Gagnon v. Scarpelli 160 that an indigent parolee who asserts a colorable claim of innocence is entitled to appointed counsel. 181 The
Court found that "the unskilled or uneducated probationer or
parolee may well have difficulty in presenting his version of a
disputed set of facts where the presentation requires the examining or cross-examining of witnesses or the offering or dissecting
of complex documentary evidence." 162 The Court acknowledged
. that requiring appointed counsel would impose additional costs
and prolong the proceeding. 163 But it held that when the effectiveness of the Morrissey rights depends upon skills which the parolee
lacks, the state's interest in efficiency must yield to the interest
of the parolee and to the state's interest in correct decisions. 18~
This "colorable claim" standard, however, depends upon the
Parole Commission's assessment of the merits of the parolee's
defense, merits which are presented without the assistance of
counsel. In such cases, the right to counsel depends on the assistance of counsel. For perhaps that reason, Congress has created a
statutory right to retained or appointed counsel in federal parolerevocation proceedings; 165 Congress believed that the govern160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

411 U.S. 778 (1973); see note 77 supra.
411 U.S. at 787.
411 U.S. at 787.
411 U.S. at 788.
411 U.S. at 786-88.
Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, 18 U.S.C.

§

4214(a)(2)(B) (1976).
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ment's interest in saving time and money is outweighed by the
interest of all parties in a correct result. The interests favoring a
correct result are, of course, equally strong in state revocation
proceedings, and therefore constitutional underpinnings for the
federal statutory right are needed to eliminate the chicken-andegg "colorable claim" standard which now allocates the right in
state revocation proceedings.
Third, the reasonable-doubt standard would reduce the margin of error in acknowledgement of the transcendent value of the
interest at stake, the parolee's liberty. 166 Moreover, because of
factors peculiar to the parolee's situation, the state's interest in
reincarcerating actual parole violators would be adequately
served by a reasonable-doubt standard. First, the parolee is subject to many specific restrictions, violations of which are objectively demonstrable without regard to his intent. 167 Proof of parole
violation is correspondingly simplified. Second, because the
parolee's conduct is monitored by his parole officer, evidence of
violations is more easily discovered than evidence of a crime. For
example, parole conditions may require that the parolee permit
his parole officer to visit his home at any reasonable hour. 168 Furthermore, search warrants are probably more freely issued in the
case of a parolee than an ordinary citizen. 169 Third, the hearing's
flexible procedure admits evidence such as letters, affidavits, and
other material1 70 which would not be admissible in a criminal
166. See text at note 128 supra.
167. Virtually all parole conditions, except the condition which prohibits criminal
violations, are prohibitions of specific acts such as consuming alcoholic beverages, driving
an automobile without permission, or leaving the jurisdiction. See Jones v. Cunningham,
371 U.S. 236, 242 (1963). By contrast, intent, or mens rea, is a necessary element of most
crimes, see, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), and creates problems
of proof whenever the defendant claims that the act was accidental.
There are, however, limits to the state's ability to impose strict liabilty for parole
violations. For example, in Arciniega v. Freeman, 404 U.S. 4 (1971), the Court held that
unauthorized contacts with other ex-convicts were insufficient to justify parole revocation,
since those contacts had been with other employees in the course of employment. Cf.
United States v. Taylor, 321 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1963) (revocation may not be based upon
nonpayment of a fine where the probationer pleads pauperism, since this would defeat
congressional intent to allow release on the pauper's oath, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3569, 3651 (1976),
of federal prisoners imprisoned for failure to pay fines).
But in most cases, parole may be revoked if the parolee is shown to have committed
an act prohibited by his parole conditions. 18 U.S.C. § 4214(d) (1976). See Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 495 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
168. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242 (1963).
169. Comment, The Parole System, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 282, 338-39 (1971). See al~o
United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1978).
170. "Other material" has, in some cases, included evidence obtained through illegal
search and seizure. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1971); United
States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970); People v. Dowery, 20
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proceeding. 171 Fourth, the revocation proceeding is conducted by
the Parole Commission, 172 the members of which are experienced
fact-finders who are less likely than a jury to be swayed by advocacy or pangs of sympathy for a parolee. 173 The reasonable-doubt
standard would not alter the informality, flexibility, or speed of
the hearing which finds facts. 174 It would simply require that the
trier of fact be more confident that the parolee did the act with
which he is charged. 175

V.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the juvenile model of due process is the appropriate
one for parole-revocation proceedings. The parolee's liberty interest is constitutionally indistinguishable from and equal in importance to the juvenile's. Moreover, no interest of the state is so
significant that it justifies denying such safeguards to parolees.
The juvenile model would not make the revocation proceeding
significantly more difficult or expensive to administer, and any
resulting problems of proof would be offset by the peculiar advantages the state would continue to have in parole-revocation proceedings.176
Ill. App. 3d 738, 312 N.E.2d 682 (1974), affd., 62 Ill. 2d 200, 340 N.E.2d 529 (1975); Stone
v. Shea, 113 N.H. 174, 304 A.2d 647 (1973). Furthermore, at least one court has admitted
evidence obtained in violation of Miranda rights. See Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa.
102, 305 A.2d 701 (1973).
171. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
172. 18 u.s.c. § 4214 (1976).
173. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 231, 242 n.19 (1963).
174. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366-67 (1970). See text at note 126 supra.
175. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 375 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (application of
the reasonable-doubt standard merely "requires a juvenile judge to be more confident in
his belief that the youth did the act with which he has been charged").
176. See text at notes 165-75 supra.
It might be thought that the practical effect of applying the juvenile model to parolerevocation proceedings will be to make the state reluctant to grant parole in the first place,
Such fears motivated the Eighth Circuit to hold due process inapplicable to parole revocation proceedings, Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942, 949 (9th Cir. 1971), but, as the
Supreme Court stated in reversing that decision, "Serious studies have suggested that fair
treatment on parole revocation will not result in fewer grants of parole." 408 U.S. 471, 483
(1972) (citing Sklar, [,aw and Practice in Probation and Parole Revocation Hearings, 55
J. CruM. L.C. & P.S. 175, 194 (1964)). Furthermore, it is by no means clear that the state
can financially afford to reduce the number of grants of parole, for the cost of imprisonment is much greater than the cost of parole supervision. See Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d
91, 102 n.16 (6th Cir. 1968) (Celebrezze, J., dissenting) (cost of imprisonment is as much
as 10 times the cost of parole supervision).
It is, however, possible that applying the juvenile model might cause some states to
eliminate parole entirely and to substitute a system of shorter prison sentences. This
would be unfortunate, since parole is a process of treatment whereby the parolee can,
under the guidance of his parole officer, learn to regulate his own activities within the
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At present, the risk of erroneously depriving the parolee of his
liberty is intolerably high. The procedural safeguards now available were designed to protect the less significant property interest
of the welfare recipient. The interest at stake is simply too important to allow mere administrative convenience or outmoded notions of rights and privileges to justify arbitrary decisions. Nothing less than the juvenile model of procedural safeguards, including the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to counsel,
and the reasonable-doubt standard, can afford protection commensurate with the transcentlent value of the parolee's liberty.
Due process demands no less. 177
framework of the law and his parole conditions, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 478
(1972); opportunities for self,rregulation are, of necessity, lacking in prison. Furthermore,
"for at least some prisoners, parole is considered a more effective form of custody than
physical incarceration, more likely to achieve society's goal of treatment of the prisoner
to prevent future crimes." Bates v. Rivers, 323 F.2d 311, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Wright, J.,
dissenting). It might thus be better in the long run to allow some parole violators to go
free than to eliminate the system totally. But while the possibility that adopting the
juvenile model might endanger the system cannot be discounted entirely, that possibility
cannot be permitted to overcome the demand of the Constitution that the parolee's liberty
be adequately protected.
177. Because the reasonable-doubt standard should be extended to parole-revocation
hearings, a parolee who faces revocation in consequence of an alleged criminal violation
would receive not only the protection of the greater degree of certitude demanded of the
trier of fact but of collateral estoppel as well. Standlee, thus, would have been acquitted
of violating his parole, since he had been found not guilty in the criminal prosecution. See
text at notes 2-3 supra. That result follows from the holding in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 ll.S.
436 (1970), that collateral estoppel inheres in the fifth amendment's double jeopardy
guarantee: "Whatever else that constitutional guarantee may embrace . . . it surely protects a man who has been acquitted from having to 'run the gantlet' a second time." 397
U.S. at 446 (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 187, 190 (1957)).

